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This article focuses on the evaluation of a biometric technique based on the performance of an identifying 
gesture by holding a telephone with an embedded accelerometer in his/her hand. The acceleration signals 
obtained when users perform gestures are analyzed following a mathematical method based on global 
sequence alignment. In this article, eight different scores are proposed and evaluated in order to quantify 
the differences between gestures, obtaining an optimal EER result of 3.42% when analyzing a random set 
of 40 users of a database made up of 80 users with real attempts of falsification. Moreover, a temporal 
study of the technique is presented leeding to the need to update the template to adapt the manner in 
which users modify how they perform their identifying gesture over time. Six updating schemes have 
been assessed within a database of 22 users repeating their identifying gesture in 20 sessions over 4 
months, concluding that the more often the template is updated the better and more stable performance 
the technique presents. 
1. Introduction 
Improving the level of security in mobile phones is a crucial 
task in order to keep the personal information included on these 
devices safe, such as the agenda, or the mail, and also to be able 
to carry out sensitive operations on the Internet where the correct 
authentication of the user trying to access is critical. 
At present there are also different approaches bringing together 
biometric techniques, physical or behavioral (Jain et al., 2007), and 
mobile phones to enhance their security (Chirillo and Blaul, 2003). 
In Tao and Veldhuis (2006) and Ijiri et al. (2006) people are authen-
ticated by the recognition of their face through the camera of a 
mobile phone. In ho Cho et al. (2006) andjeong et al. (2005) authen-
tication is provided by means of iris scanning and in Shabeer and 
Suganthi (2007) the characteristic biometric features are the voice 
and the fingerprint. Moreover, in Clarke and Furnell (2007) users 
are recognized by keystroke analysis. 
In this article, we work on a novel biometric technique adapted 
to mobile phones with an embedded accelerometer, where users 
are authenticated when they perform an identifying gesture cor-
rectly (in-air signature), created by them, by holding a mobile 
telephone in their hand. This biometric technique stands out 
because of the high acceptability of the users, since it is quite sim-
ilar to a handwritten signature and the suitable resistance to fraud 
when imposters try to repeat an authentic in-air signature. 
Indeed, in Guerra-Casanova et al. (2010) an Active impostor test 
was presented, obtaining an Equal Error Rate of 2.5% when 40 peo-
ple repeated their own in-air signature and three fraudsters tried 
to forge each of them by studying the performance of the authentic 
gestures filmed on video. This result was obtained when a sequence 
alignment method was carried out to analyze the signals involved 
in the process. In this article, we use again sequence alignment but 
we focus on the study of different scores to quantify the differences 
between the two gestures, trying to reduce the Equal Error Rate of 
the system. Actually, four different scores and a strategy of normal-
ization are proposed, deriving in eight dissimilar experiments to be 
evaluated. 
As well as finding an optimal score to compute the differences 
between gestures, it is important to assess the behavior of the tech-
nique over time. All behavioral biometric techniques, like the one 
proposed in this article, involve the fact that users may modify 
their behavior over time. As a consequence, a continuous biometric 
authentication maybe required (Solami et al, 2010) or a template 
updating procedure (Li et al, 2008; Rattani et al, 2009). 
In the context of the biometric technique based on identify-
ing gestures, a solution based on continuous authentication is 
not appropriate since users are not making their gesture at every 
moment. However, template updating may offer a suitable solu-
tion to adapt templates and variances to the making of of gestures. 
Actually, this is a common practice in other biometric techniques 
where the biometric characteristic may change over time, as in 
hand recognition (Amayeh et al., 2009), fingerprint (Freni et al., 
2008) or face (Singh et al, 2009; Marcialis et al, 2008; Rattani et al., 
2008). 
Summarizing, this article focuses on two main objectives: 
• Finding an optimal configuration of the algorithm in order to 
reduce as much as possible the errors when the system denies 
access to authenticusers as well as granting access to an impostor. 
• By studying the strength of the technique over time, proposing 
and evaluating different template updating strategies in order to 
adapt the template of users to how they modify unconsciously 
the way in which they perform their identifying gesture. 
According to this, the article is divided into the following sec-
tions: In Section 2 the mathematical method proposed to compare 
two gestures is introduced. In this description, the eight different 
scores studied to quantify the differences between gestures are 
explained. Next, in Section 3 the results of applying each score to 
analyze the error rates in a database of 40 users with real falsifica-
tions are presented. As a consequence of the results of this section, 
the score with the lowest error rate is selected as the optimal and 
used in the subsequent sections. After that, Section 4 includes a 
temporal study when no updating is carried out as a means of 
confirming the necessity of updating. Then, six different updating 
strategies, with three variations each, are presented and evaluated. 
Finally, in Section 5 the conclusions of the work are provided. 
2. Mathematical analysis method 
When a user performs his/her identifying gesture in the air by 
holding a telephone with an embedded accelerometer in his/her 
hand, the feature extraction system obtains the accelerations of the 
gesture in the three axes sampled at frequency rate of 50 Hz, enough 
to distinguish between different repetitions with a compromise of 
quality and consumption time (Kela et al, 2006; Mantyjarvi et al., 
2004). 
Thereby, the analysis of the biometric system should deal 
with acceleration signals, considering the following characteristics 
when the same identifying gesture is repeated: 
• The beginning of the gestures does not match. 
• There are peaks of acceleration more pronounced than others. 
• Gestures do not take the same amount of time to be performed. 
• In certain parts of the performance of the gestures, transitions are 
faster or slower. 
According to these particularities of the acceleration signals, an 
analysis method based on sequence alignment is proposed to solve 
the differences between two repetitions of the same gesture per-
formed by the same user but keeping significant the contrast when 
the gesture is made by other user (Durbin et al., 2006). 
In this approach there is no feature normalization process, since 
how users hold the mobile and make the movements to perform 
their identifying gesture is very valuable information. Indeed, the 
goal of this technique is not to recognize the identifying gesture 
but the person who makes it, therefore, information such as how 
the user naturally holds the device and move it through the air is 
very important and would be discarded if the algorithm were inde-
pendent to orientation. According to this, the biometric technique 
proposed is oriented dependant but the slight differences in hold-
ing the device or making the gesture are corrected by the algorithm 
described below. 
The general method of analyzing two acceleration signals is 
explained in this Section. As specified by the scope of this article, the 
proposed scores to measure the differences between performances 
of signatures are defined throughout the description of the math-
ematical method. It is remarkable that the algorithm explained 
considers only the acceleration signals of one axis, so when two 
gestures are compared, three executions of the algorithm should 
be run, and obviously, three values of each score are obtained. The 
final value of the score measuring the differences at the gesture 
level is calculated by the average of the scores obtained at the axis 
level. 
Therefore, the algorithm proposed tries to find the best global 
alignment between two signals of acceleration v, w. For this rea-
son, a matrix S of punctuations is created and filled dynamically 
following Eq. (1): 
i sjj-i + h 
siJ = max.i s^j^+A (1) 
I si-i,j + h 
In this equation, it is observed that: 
• The overall punctuation is increased by penalty h when the punc-
tuation on a point (¡,j) of the matrix comes from its vertical or 
horizontal neighbour. These kinds of movements on matrix Swill 
correspond to the introduction of a zero value in that point of 
sequence v (if vertical movement) or w (if horizontal) in order 
to find the optimal alignment of both sequences. Furthermore, h 
should comply with Eq. (2) so that the algorithm works properly. 
h < 0.5 (2) 
• The punctuation of a diagonal movement depends on the value 
of a fuzzy function A, representing to what extent two points 
Vj, Wj are similar. A follows Eq. (3), where a is a parameter used 
to normalize the difference between two points into a gaussian 
(de Santos Sierra et al., 2008) 
("-j-"i>2 
A = e 2ff2 (3) 
Consequently, matrix S is completed depending on the punc-
tuation filled in previous point of the signals and whether the two 
points ofthe sequences compared are more similar than the penalty 
of including a gap to find the best global alignment. 
At this point, the first two scores are proposed in order to quan-
tify the differences between signals: 
• The first score \jf\ is defined by Eq. (4) representing the value of 
the last point ofthe matrix of punctuations S, which is equivalent 
to the maximization ofthe score proposed in 1 over all the points 
ofthe sequences. 
xh=S{m,n) (4) 
• The second score x[/2 is defined as the number of gaps introduced 
into the best alignment ofthe sequences, as follows in Eq. (5) 
xjf2 = #Gaps (5) 
At this point, the general analysis method carries out a back-
tracking algorithm in order to find the optimally aligned signals 
v' and w'. This algorithm consists of discovering the path to travel 
on matrix S from S(m, n) to S(l, 1) depending on the expression 
selected in Eq. (1) to calculate each point ofthe path. Any vertical 
or horizontal movement means including a zero in that point of v 
or w. Consequently, v' and w' are obtained by including some zeros 
in particular points in order to be aligned optimally. 
These zero values are interpolated and thereafter a distance is 
calculated in order to measure the differences between the already 
aligned signals. Two different distances have been proposed, lead-
ing to scores 1^ 3 and 1^ 4: 
3. Score selection 
The third score xfr3 is obtained as the Euclidean distance between 
the aligned signals as described in Eq. (6): 
f3 = ^(.V'i ~ VJ[)2 (6) 
The forth score xfr^ represents the sum of the differences between 
the aligned signals in absolute value, Eq. (7) 
f4 = ^ j " ¡ - w;i (7) 
In all the scores presented previously, the length of the signa-
tures involved is not considered. However, it might seem quite 
obvious that the longer a signature is the more differences may 
appear. This behavior is studied by the normalization in the length 
of all the scores. Therefore, the normalization factor L is obtained 
as the average of the length of the signals in comparison, and used 
to normalize the score as described in the following Equations: 
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As gesture samples consist of three signals of acceleration (one 
for each axis), when two gestures are compared, three implemen-
tations of the algorithm are required and three punctuations of r/r{ 
are obtained, one for each axis. % denotes the average of the three 
punctuations obtained when analyzing all the signals of each axis 
for each score r/r{ and represents the quantification of the differ-
ences between the two gestures inspected. 
A user who enrolls in the system should repeat his/her iden-
tifying gesture three times. Afterwards, each pair of gestures is 
analyzed, obtaining three resulting values of tf^.The average of the 
comparison of each pair of the three performances of gestures at 
enrollment is symbolized as /¿,- in accordance with Eq. (12). This 
value is stored with these signals as the identifying gesture tem-
plate of the user. 
m 
XpP _|_ \p}3 _|_ \p23 
(12) 
When an already enrolled user wishes to access the system, 
he/she should carry out his/her identifying gesture once. Then, 
this sample is compared with the three gestures performed at the 
enrolling phase, obtaining three values Wl (j means the sample of 
the template with which it has been compared with). The final value 
% is calculated as the average of each ¡Pj and represents to what 
extent the gesture made is similar to all the samples in the template. 
The lower it is, the more similar the performance of the gesture is 
in relation to the template. 
If Eq. (13) is complied with, the user would access the system. 
Otherwise, he/she would be rejected. Obviously, the higher the 
threshold 9{ is, the more falsification attempts would be accepted 
into the system but the less original users would be rejected, and 
vice versa. 
<ei (13) 
The evaluation of the results of the experiments in this Section is 
carried out through the analysis of a database of 80 users who have 
repeated their identifying gesture seven times in the air holding an 
¡Phone in their hand used to perform the gesture. All of these ges-
tures have been filmed on video. From the study of these records, 
each original gesture has been tried to be imitated by three different 
people (8 trials each), representing impostors attempting to forge 
the biometric system. Consequently, the database of gestures con-
sidered in this article is made up of 560 samples of original in-air 
signatures and 1920 real attempts at falsification. 
In this article we present an evaluation of the eight scores pro-
posed in the previous section in order to find the optimal and 
analyze the fraud resistance of this biometric technique based on 
gestures when an impostor tries to falsify an authentic in-air sig-
nature of someone else. 
The assessment of the fraud resistance is performed in two 
steps: 
1. Firstly, the Equal Error Rate is obtained from a subset of the sam-
ples of the database (40 users, which means half of the in-air 
signatures of the database).The EER has been calculated 10 times 
per experiment. Each of them has been carried out with a differ-
ent and random division of the database in order to make the 
results independent to the gestures in the database. For each 
score evaluated, 200 different configurations of the parameters 
a and h of the algorithm have been tested (h from 0 to 0.5 with 
intervals of 0.025 and a from 0 to 1 with intervals of 0.1). The 
configuration for each score achieving the lowest EER value has 
been selected. Each EER was obtained as follows for each score 
%lfi (Wayman et al., 2004): 
• Template creation: Three samples of each in-air signature are 
considered as the template of the user. Then, m is calculated 
as explained in Section 2. 
• Analysis of original samples: The remaining four original sam-
ples of each gesture are used to evaluate whether the system 
grants access to the trutful users or, on the contrary, denies 
access to original users. For each original trial, "¿V/A,- is 
obtained when comparing the accessing gesture with the three 
gestures of the original user template. 
• Analysis of falsified samples: All the falsifying attempts trying to 
access the system will be used to evaluate whether the system 
is able or not to reject impostors. For each falsification trial, 
^il¡Li is also obtained. 
• Obtention of False Acceptance Rates (FAR(0,-)) and False Rejection 
Rates (FRR(6>,-)): FAR(6>,-) and FRR(0,) are obtained in terms of 
61 as the % of original samples that are over 0,- in case of False 
Rejection Rates and the % of falsified samples that are under 9{ 
in case of False Acceptance Rates. It is proven that when 0,- is 
very low, most falsifications are rejected but also some authen-
tic access are not accepted. On the other hand, the higher the 6it 
the more original access are allowed but also the more falsifi-
cations are granted. FAR(0,-) and FRR(0¡) are obtained for values 
of et from 0 to msx.{Vt/¡it) in 10,000 steps. 
• Obtention of Equal Error Rate (EER) and the optimal threshold 
(#EER)- EER is defined as the value of the error when the False 
Acceptance Rates are equal to the False Rejection Rates. The 
value of the threshold at the intersection of both rates $EER is 
the optimal threshold value the system should implement in 
order to get as few errors as possible. 
2. Secondly, a testing phase is carried out in order to evaluate to 
what extent the error rate results of the optimal configuration 
depend on the set of gestures of the database selected. There-
fore, for each of the 10 repetitions of the algorithm, the samples 
of users that were not used in obtaining the EER, are used to cal-
Table 1 
Results for each score. 
taken into consideration. In particular, FAR and FRR of score xf/g 
are quite close to the respective EER value. 
Score 
ti 
f2 
ti 
t* 
ts 
fn 
fi 
ts 
Optimal EER 
5.46 ± 1.61 
7.87 ± 1.01 
3.95 ± 0.96 
3.73 ± 0.86 
4.60 ± 1.76 
7.77 ± 1.49 
4.67 ± 1.51 
3.42 ± 1.22 
Threshold #EER 
0.96 ± 0.01 
1.26 ± 0.02 
1.36 ± 0.03 
1.42 ± 0.04 
0.96 ± 0.02 
1.37 ± 0.03 
1.43 ± 0.06 
1.54 ± 0.07 
FAR(Í?EER) 
8.26 ± 6.49 
9.05 ± 3.00 
4.01 ± 2.41 
6.38 ± 2.71 
6.05 ± 3.45 
11.81 ±3.89 
6.76 ± 3.31 
3.67 ±3.11 
FRR (SEER) 
10.19 ± 6.65 
9.30 ± 2.76 
5.03 ± 2.43 
5.66 ± 1.70 
6.23 ± 3.32 
8.04 ± 1.85 
4.45 ± 2.78 
4.10 ± 2.63 
culate False Acceptance Rate and False Rejection Rate in respect 
to the threshold 0EER previously obtained: 
• False Acceptance Rate: FAR is obtained as the % of the falsifying 
samples that are accepted in the system when the value of the 
threshold is set to 8EER- This is equivalent to the percentage of 
fraudulent samples complying with "¿V/Aj < 9EER-
• False Rejection Rate: FRR is calculated as the % of the authentic 
samples that are rejected in the system when the value of the 
threshold is set to 8EER, which is analogous to the percentage 
of original samples fulfilling ^/ /A,- > $EER-
Summarizing, for of each configuration and each score, the 
following process has been carried out: firstly, by dividing the 
database into two halfs, secondly, calculating the EER and the opti-
mal threshold for the first half of the in-air signatures and finally, 
evaluating FAR and FRR with the second half of the samples of 
the database and the previously obtained optimal threshold. It is 
highlighted that each division of the database has been carried 
out randomly, and experiments for each configuration and each 
score have been repeated 10 times in order to make the results 
independent of the subset selected. 
Following all these considerations, the eight scores proposed in 
Section 2 have been evaluated, obtaining the results presented in 
Table 1. In this table, the results of the configuration for each score 
with the lowest average EER are presented. Specifically, each row of 
the table represents the optimal result for each score, and presents 
the following values: 
• Optimal EER: The lowest value of EER obtained (Average and 
standard deviation of the 10 repetitions of the algorithm with 
different and random division of the database) 
• The value O/$EER-' the threshold value corresponding to the inter-
section point EER has been obtained from (Average and standard 
deviation). 
• False Acceptance Rate: Percentage of accepted forgeries of the 
samples not used to calculate EER, setting the threshold to 8EER 
(Average and standard deviation). 
• False Rejection Rate: Percentage of rejected truthful access of the 
samples not used to calculate ERR, setting the threshold to 8EER 
value (Average and standard deviation). 
From Table 1 it may be concluded that: 
• Normalization may improve or worsen the results of the algo-
rithm. In particular, the best result is achieved when normalizing. 
• The lowest Equal Error Rate has been obtained when quantifying 
the differences between two performance of gestures with the 
score x[/g. This result has been obtained within a configuration of 
the parameters of the algorithm of h = 0.2 and a = 0.65. 
• When evaluating with other gestures of the database EER has 
been obtained from, FAR and FRR are higher than EER. 
• FAR and FRR of scores are relatively close to the EER value, which 
means that the closer they are the more optimally the system 
behaves when gestures not used to calculate the optimal QEER are 
Finally, the experiments described in the following Section are 
carried out within the optimal configuration found in this section, 
which means using score x[/s, h = 0.2, a = 0.65 and the value of the 
threshold 0EER = 1.54. 
4. Updating scenarios: proposal and evaluation 
From the previous Section, it is concluded that a high per-
formance in terms of Equal Error Rate could be obtained when 
authenticating users with gestures in the air while holding a mobile 
device in comparison with real falsification attempts. However, 
it should be taken into consideration that users are not able to 
repeat their gestures exactly over time, since they constantly mod-
ify how they perform them. Consequently, False Rejection Rate 
would increase due to the performance of the gestures of the users 
through the time, and obviously, Error Rates of the system would 
increase as well. In this context, a template updating method is 
needed in order to adapt the template to the variance of the per-
formance of the gestures. 
According to this, an evaluation of the behavior of the tech-
nique when users access the system with their identifying gesture 
in many different sessions over a long period of time is presented 
in this section. For this purpose, a "permanence" database has been 
developed consiting of 22 users repeating their identifying gesture, 
created by them, five times in 20 sessions spread over four months. 
Each session of each user has been obtained in intervals from 1 
to 5 days. Moreover, sessions 10 and 11 of each user have been 
separated by at least one month. 
In this section, firstly, an evaluation of the samples of the 
database when no updating strategy is applied is presented (Sce-
nario 0), in order to confirm the need to update when users 
access the system over time. Furthermore, this section introduces 
the results of the evaluation of the samples in the "permanence" 
database in six groups of template updating scenarios, with differ-
ent updating intervals. For each group of scenarios, the study of 
the updating strateg yis included in accordance with the following 
• (3 M) The three samples that make up the template are modified 
alternatively: On each updating process, the oldest of the three 
samples of the template is modified by the new one. 
• (2M) Two of the samples of the template are changed in turns: 
On each updating process, the oldest of two of the samples of the 
template is modified by the new one whereas one of the template 
samples is never substituted. 
• (1 M) Only one of the three template samples is replaced: On each 
updating process, only one of the samples of the template, and 
always the same, is modified whereas the other two, obtained at 
enrollment, are never varied. 
Taking this into consideration, the groups of template updating 
scenarios assessed in this article are: 
• Scenario 0: No updating. 
• Scenario 1: "Always updating": Updating the template on each 
successful access of the user to the system. 
• Scenario 2: "One-out-of-two updating": Updating the template on 
each one out of two successful access of the user. 
• Scenario 3: "One-out-of-three updating": Updating the template 
on each one out of three successful access of the user. 
• Scenario 4: "In-1 -session updating": Updating the template once 
on each session. 
• Scenario 5: "In-2-session updating": Updating the template once 
on each two sessions. 
• Scenario 6: "In-3-session updating": Updating the template once 
on each three sessions. 
In all the experiments introduced in this section, the three first 
attempts of each user at the first sessions are considered as the ges-
tures performed at enrollment phase, building the initial template 
of each user which is modified following the instructions of each 
updating strategy. 
It is remarkable that when an updating process is carried out, 
not only the substitution of one of the samples of the template 
by the successful access is performed, but also, jig is recalculated. 
Therefore, as the template has been completely modified, False 
Acceptance Rate (FAR)) should be determined again. According to 
this, in all the experiments, FAR is calculated each time each tem-
plate is updated, storing the results separately for each session. In 
addition to this, False Rejection Rate (FRR) is also obtained sepa-
rately by sessions, from the results of the access to the system of 
the original users in comparison with their templates in the state 
of updating of that precise session. Note that False Acceptance Rate 
and False Rejection Rate are obtained using the value of the optimal 
threshold obtained in the previous Section: 
• False Acceptance Rate is calculated as the % of impostor samples 
complying with Wg/jig < 1.54. 
• False Acceptance Rate is the % of original samples that Wg/ jig > 
1.54. 
In this manner, the results of these experiments are independent 
of the optimization of the system since they have not been used to 
obtain the &g value. 
According to this, each scenario presents the following results 
in order to evaluate the updating strategy and the improvement 
it introduces with respect to the system in Scenario 0 when no 
template updating is carried out: 
• False Acceptance Rate and False Rejection Rate per session: For 
each scenario, FAR and FRR are obtained by using the samples 
of each session separately. Thus, for each session, the original 
samples of the session are used to obtained FRR and update 
the template. On each updating of the template, FAR is calcu-
lated from the comparison of the impostor samples with the 
updated templates. (As there are no falsifying attempts in this 
database, the impostor samples used for each in air signature are 
the original samples of the rest of the users). These results are 
represented in different figures (one for each scenario), symbol-
izing the behavior of the error rates over time for each updating 
proposal. 
• Mean and standard deviation of FAR and FRR: In order to deduce 
which scenario provides better results, an overall analysis should 
be carried out. Accordingly, the mean and the standard deviation 
of FAR and FRR are calculated as a means of comparing the average 
and the variance of the errors in a general manner. 
4.1. Scenario 0: No updating 
In this scenario, the results when no template updating strategy 
applied are presented in order to evaluate, firstly, the convenience 
and necessity of an updating method. 
Therefore, False Rejection Rate is calculated by considering all 
the original access of the users at different sessions (except those 
used for enrollment). Furthermore, False Acceptance Rate is also 
obtained by using the samples of the rest of the users as impostor 
attempts. Both rates are evaluated with a value of &g = 1.54, as 
obtained in the previous Section. 
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Fig. 1. Scenario 0: False Acceptance and False Rejection Rate per session when no 
updating. 
According to this, the evolution of FRR and FAR through the time 
is represented in Fig. 1. 
It is noticeable that the FRR values increase considerably over 
time, achieving even almost 70% of error. On the other hand, FAR 
remains constant since no updating process has been conducted so 
/ig of all the templates did not varied. 
Therefore, it is deduced that users modify the manner they per-
form their identifying gesture significantly over time, so samples 
obtained when some time has elapsed could be quite different from 
those extracted when enrolling or at the first sessions. As a conse-
quence, it seems evident that the error rates of the system would 
increase when it is used over a long period of time. 
It is also highlighted that the behavior of the trend of FRR 
over time is, in general, increasing but continuous. Consequently, 
it might be deduced that users modify continuously but slightly 
between consecutive sessions the way they perform their gesture, 
thus, an updating strategy according to these characteristics could 
diminish error rates over time by updating the templates of the 
users in accordance with the modification of the performance of 
the gestures by the users. 
4.2. Scenario 1: Always updating 
In this scenario, the updating strategy proposed consists of sub-
stituting one of the samples of the template of each user by each 
original sample arriving the system. Therefore, this strategy rep-
resents an "always updating" scheme where the updating phase is 
carried out anytime the user performs his/her gesture to authenti-
cate him/herself. 
According to this, and due to the fact that the template is modi-
fied for each access, False Acceptance Rate is recalculated from each 
of the templates created through the study of all the database. As 
there are five samples for each gesture and each session, it is nec-
essary to analyze all the falsified samples 95 times for each gesture 
(one for each variance of the template of the gesture). All these 
punctuations are stored separately by sessions in order to calculate 
the overall False Acceptance Rate, considering all the values, and 
the Daily False Acceptance Rates, regarding only the punctuations 
obtained in the session examined. 
However, False Rejection Rate is calculated following the order 
of the samples obtained through different sessions, representing 
a real implementation of the system, where the original users try 
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Fig. 2. Scenario 1: False Acceptance and False Rejection Rate per session. Fig. 3. Scenario 2: False Acceptance and False Rejection Rate per session. 
to access five times each session and their templates are updated 
constantly. Therefore, the samples used to calculate Daily False 
Rejection Rates are those performed in the session of the session 
evaluated and compared with the corresponding template updated 
at that moment. Furtehrmore, the overall False Rejection Rate is 
calculated by considering the analysis of all the samples of all the 
sessions of each gesture. 
Moreover, this scheme has been assessed when updating one of 
the three (3 M), one of the two (2M) or always the same one (1 M) 
of the samples of the template of each user in a rotary manner. FAR 
and FRR on each session when updating following this scenario are 
presented in Fig. 2. In this figure, results when updating rotarily one 
of the three samples of the template are in black [3 M], whereas red 
lines stand for when the updating is performed within two samples 
[2M] and blue lines when the sample of the template modified is 
always the same [1 M]. 
In Fig. 2 it can be observed that error rates get very high when 
not modifying all the samples of the template rotarily. However, in 
the [3M] case, a very interesting result is obtained as error rates 
are moderately low and stable. 
In addition to this, Table 2 provides the resulting values of the 
average and standard deviation of the FAR, the FRR and the average 
of both error rates over time obtained when updating one of three, 
of two or always the same of the template. 
The results presented in Table 2 in conjuction with Fig. 2 mean 
that by following this strategy, an updating method is obtained able 
to adapt to how the users modify the manner in which they perform 
their signature in the air over time with a low average and stable 
error. 
In conclusion, the strategy proposed in this scenario introduces 
great improvements as regards when no updating, reducing the 
average FAR to 1.67% and the FRR to 5.32% in a very constant manner 
(1.57% of standard deviation of the average of error rates) over time 
when the [3 M] case is selected. 
4.3. Scenario 2: One-out-of-two updating 
The second updating strategy considers updating the template 
often but not always. In particular, it is based on substituting one of 
the samples of the template any two accesses found, reducing the 
updating speed of the previous scenario by half. 
According to this, in this article, template updating has been 
carried out in samples number one, three and five of each of the 
sessions of each gesture of the database (except session 1). Conse-
quently, each user template was modified 57 times (three times for 
each session), and again, falsifying samples were analyzed for each 
variance of the template. 
Therefore, following this scheme the evolution of the FAR and 
FRR are presented in Fig. 3. 
In this figure, the same not recommended behaviours of cases 
[2 M] and [1 M] can be observed, since when several sessions have 
taken place, the FAR increases significantly. On the other hand, the 
[3 M] case provides a much better result, similar than in Scenario 1 
but with slightly less stable. 
Table 3 compiles the FAR and FRR averages and standard devi-
ations over time when updating one of three, of two or always the 
same of the template. 
Therefore, the [3 M] case in this scenario also provides good 
results in terms of performance of the FAR and FRR, but some more 
peaks have been found when analising these error rates which pro-
duce a high standard deviation value (2.40%) in the average of FAR 
and FRR. 
4.4. Scenario 3: One-out-of-three updating 
The third scenario proposes a very similar strategy to scenarios 
1 and 2 but updating at a lower speed. In this scheme, only two 
updates were performed for each gesture and each session, corre-
sponding to samples number two and four of the samples of each 
gesture and each session in the database. 
Table 2 
Average and deviation error rates for Scenario 1. 
Case FAR% FRR% (FAR + FRR)/2% 
Table 3 
Average and deviation error rates for Scenario 2. 
Case FAR% FRR% (FAR + FRR)/2% 
[3M] 
[2M] 
[1M] 
1.67 ± 1.42 
10.50 ± 5.38 
10.79 ± 5.61 
5.32 ± 1.72 
1.24 ± 1.50 
1.53 ± 1.48 
3.50 ± 1.57 
5.87 ± 3.44 
6.16 ±3.55 
[3M] 
[2M] 
[1M] 
1.78 ± 1.67 
10.54 ± 5.61 
10.88 ± 5.53 
6.37 ± 3.14 
2.22 ± 4.35 
2.07 ± 1.66 
4.08 ± 2.40 
6.38 ± 4.98 
6.48 ± 3.60 
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Fig. 4. Scenario 3: False Acceptance and False Rejection Rate per session. Fig. 5. Scenario 4: False Acceptance and False Rejection Rate per session. 
This strategy means calculating 38 times the analysis of falsify-
ing samples for each gesture (one for each template modified). 
Following this scheme, the FAR and FRR obtained in each session 
are presented in Fig. 4, representing the [3M], [2M] and[l M] cases. 
Moreover, Table 4 presents the FAR and FRR averages and stan-
dard deviations over time when the strategy evaluated in this 
scenario is considerd. The results are detailed for all the cases 
assessed: when updating one of three, of two or always the same 
of the template. 
The results of this strategy are quite similar but slightly worse 
than the previous two scenarios. 
4.5. Scenario 4:¡n-l-session updating 
The forth updating strategy proposed decreases the updating 
interval to once in each session. Therefore, the user's template will 
be updated on the first authentic access in the session. This means 
that the first access in the session is analyzed in comparison with 
the template of the previous session, and after that, if successful, the 
updating method is carried out. Therefore, the template is modified 
slowly enough to keep some variance between the gestures that 
make up the template. 
This scenario has been also evaluated considering the different 
number of samples involved at updating, one of three (3 M), one of 
two (2M) or only one of them (1 M). 
Following this scheme, in Fig. 5 the results of FAR and FRR in 
each session for each number of samples involved are presented. 
In this figure it can be seen that although the FRR on average has a 
reasonable value, there are two peaks of error of almost 20% corre-
sponding to two different sessions. Therefore, the updating interval 
should be lower than the one in this scenario. 
The FAR and FRR averages and standard deviations over time 
following the strategy in this scenario are presented in Table 5. 
The aforementioned peaks of error introduced a high deviation 
in case [3 M], which is the one which provides lower (FAR + FRR)/2 
results. 
Table 4 
Average and deviation error rates for Scenario 3. 
Case FAR% FRR% (FAR + FRR)/2% 
[3M] 
[2M] 
[1M] 
1.52 ± 1.45 
10.77 ± 5.84 
10.55 ± 5.85 
5.69 ± 1.90 
1.9910 ± 2.03 
2.13 ± 2.06 
3.59 ± 1.67 
6.38 ± 3.93 
6.34 ± 3.95 
Table 5 
Average and deviation error rates for Scenario 4. 
Case FAR% FRR% (FAR + FRR)/2% 
[3M] 
[2M] 
[1M] 
1.19 ± 1.83 
9.7718 ±5.11 
10.27 ± 6.34 
7.15 ± 4.64 
1.88 ± 1.81 
3.18 ± 2.10 
4.17 ±3.26 
5.82 ± 3.46 
6.73 ± 4.21 
4.6. Scenario 5: In-2-session updating 
The fifth updating strategy proposes to update the template at 
a slower speed, at the beginning of each two sessions. 
According to this scheme, Fig. 6 presents the general EER 
obtained when one of three, two or one of the samples of the tem-
plate has been modified. Following this schema, a low average of 
FAR and FRR is obtained, but both rates appear to be very unstable. 
There are two peaks of almost 10% of error. Note in this figure that 
the FAR values are repeated in groups of two, since in the sessions 
where there is no updating process, the FAR does not change. 
The FAR and FRR averages and standard deviations over time 
considering the strategy in this scenario are compiled in Table 6, 
FAR [3M] 
FRR [3M] 
FAR [2M] 
FRR [2M] 
FAR [1M] 
FRR[1M] 
i \ ' 
i \ ' 
I I 
Fig. 6. Scenario 5: False Acceptance and False Rejection Rate per session. 
Table 6 
Average and deviation error rates for Scenario 5. 
5. Conclusions and future work 
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Fig. 7. Scenario 6: False Acceptance and False Rejection Rates per session. 
where the results for [3M], [2M] and [1 M] are presented sepa-
rately: 
This scenario in case [3 M] provides a lower average error rate 
than in Scenario 1 (2.43% versus 3.50%), but it is much more unstable 
(2.32% versus 1.57%). This means that on average, it would not be so 
important to update at a high speed but, if the updating interval is 
long enough, some unexpected peaks of errors may appear, which 
might make the system unpredictable. 
4.7. Scenario 6: ¡n-3-session updating 
Finally, the updating strategy evaluated in this scenario pro-
poses a very low speed updating scheme. It suggest updating 
the templates at the beginning of each three sessions. Therefore, 
the templates are slightly corrected in respect to the templates 
obtained at enrollment. 
Following this updating scheme obtains the FAR and FRR values 
over time represented in Fig. 7. In this updating strategy, the FRR per 
session is quite unstable, including a great number of high peaks. 
In addition to this, Table 7 provides the values of both the aver-
age and standard deviation of the FAR, the FRR and the average of 
both error rates over time obtained when updating one of three, of 
two or always the same of the template. 
The best average FAR and FRR obtained in this scenario (case 
[3 M]) is 3.55%, with a considerable amount of dispersion. There-
fore, this updating strategy does not improve the results of previous 
scenarios. 
Table 7 
Average and deviation error rates for See 
Case 
[3 Ml 
[2M] 
[1M] 
FAR% 
1.45 ± 1.83 
12.41 ± 5.95 
10.33 ± 5.00 
nario 6. 
FRR% 
5.65 ± 3.37 
2.22 ±3.18 
4.34 ± 3.38 
(FAR + FRR)/2% 
3.55 ± 2.60 
7.32 ± 4.57 
7.34 ±4.19 
In this article a biometric technique based on the performance 
of identifying gestures while holding a mobile phone on a hand 
has been studied. When a gesture is performed, the accelerometers 
embedded in the mobile device obtain, at a sampling rate of 50 Hz, 
the values of the accelerations on each of the three axes of the space 
corresponding to the gesture performed. 
For this purpose, a mathematical method to analyze difference 
between acceleration signals has been developed. This method is 
related to dynamic programming and global sequence alignment 
techniques. As a consequence of the application of this method to 
compare acceleration signals, eight different score definitions have 
been proposed to quantify the differences between performances 
of gestures. 
Moreover, all these scores have been evaluated by analyzing a 
database of 80 users who have performed their identifying gesture 
(chosen by them) in front of a video camera. From these records, 
three different imposters attempted to forge each gesture. 
According to this, from the study of the samples of 40 users, the 
Equal Error Rates and the optimal thresholds for each score have 
been obtained. From these optimal thresholds, False Acceptance 
and False Rejection Rates have been calculated with the remaining 
40 users. For each score, 200 different configurations of the param-
eters h and a have been tested. Each configuration of the algorithm 
for each score has been implemented 10 times with the random 
division of the users of the database used to train (EER and optimal 
threshold) and evaluate (FAR and FRR) in order to make the results 
the most independent possible from the users in the database. 
In these conditions, the optimal score means to align the signals 
in comparison, interpolate the zeros included in the alignment pro-
cess, calculate the sum of differences between the aligned signals 
in absolute value, and finally, normalize this value by the average of 
the two length of the original signals. Following this procedure, an 
EER of 3.42% has been obtained. With the threshold deduced from 
the obtention of EER, a FAR of 1.54% and FRR of 3.67% has been 
obtained when applying the algorithm to the samples of the users 
not used to calculate EER. Hence, this configuration (score, param-
eters h and a and threshold) has been considered as the optimal 
and adopted for the rest of experiments. 
Next, a temporal study of the technique has been introduced 
by studying the behavior of the system when users repeated their 
gestures over a long period of time. In particular, a database of 22 
users repeating their gestures in 20 sessions spread over 4 months 
has been assessed. 
As a consequence of this study, in Scenario 0, it has been con-
cluded that a template updating strategy is necessary to make this 
biometric technique useful, since without it, errors increase con-
siderably at users unconsciously modify the way in which they 
perform their gesture when they repeat it at different times. Actu-
ally, FRR achieves values of 70% of error when a long time has 
elapsed and no updating process has been carried out. 
Consequently, six different updating methods were proposed, 
including three different updating implementation cases for each 
of them. From this study the following deductions are achieved: 
By alternatively modifying one of the three samples of the tem-
plate, a much better performance is obtained than when one or 
two samples of the template remains without alteration. 
The more the template is updated the better and more stable 
performance is obtained. 
Even though the template is updated in several sessions, the aver-
age FAR and FRR results imply a good performance. However, it 
might appear some peaks of errors might appear whether the 
template was not updated for a long period of time. 
Therefore, the optimal updating strategy studied in this article 
consists of substituting one of the three samples (the oldest one) of 
the template whenever an authentic sample is found. 
Following this updating strategy, the average FAR and FRR 
results are 1.67% and 5.32%, respectively, which implies and aver-
age error of 3.50%. This average error is obtained with a standard 
deviation of 1.57%, the lowest in the article since it belongs to the 
most stable strategy. These results offer a huge improvement in 
comparison with when no updating process is implemented. 
From the idea of "the best updating method is updated as often 
as possible", a very interesting future work to continue this updat-
ing approach would consist of obtaining a big database of people 
trying to enter the system at different intervals (several times a day, 
once a day, once each two days, once each weak, etc.), and studying 
different models to adapt the updating strategy to how often the 
users make their identifying gesture. 
In summary, from this article it is concluded that it is possi-
ble to include some biometric security level in mobile applications 
where a personal authentication is required. In this article, this user 
authentication procedure is achieved through a biometric tech-
nique based on performing an identifying gesture created by users 
holding a mobile telephone with an embedded accelerometer in 
their hand. This biometric technique provides acceptable results 
when the optimal score presented in this article is selected as well 
as an optimal updating strategy is introduced. 
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